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Introduction 
TRUST formation in computer networks by means of verification protocols has become an im-
portant subject in computer science and impacts the architecture and design of networked applica-
tions in a wide range. This issue is particularly relevant in the face of future increasing threats from 
quantum computing, when it will become impossible to rely only on the cryptographic strength of 
key system parameters. 
In this paper, we draw attention to the analogy between consensus formation in social networks 
and trust formation in verification computer protocols. In both application domains, trust could be 
built within different possible topological architectures. It is interesting that consensus formation, in 
both disciplines, could be reached, among other topologies, both for a hierarchical and for a distrib-
uted architecture. However, the computational efficiency, in this context quantified by the time to 
consensus, can be quite different and depends both on the number of nodes and on the network to-
pology. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the paradigmatic voter model and 
present the results of simulation with two types of different architectures. In section 3 we generalize 
the main principles of the most widespread infrastructure and describe how it could be implemented 
with different architectures. Finally, in section 4 we compare and discuss the results of consensus 
formation time simulations, and discuss practical implications. 
1. Consensus formation in social networks  
1.1. The paradigmatic voter model 
In this work, we are primarily concerned with the consensus formation in hierarchical versus 
distributed consensus protocols, highlighting the network topology dependence of the system size 
scaling. In complementing perspective, topology-dependence of consensus formation has been ex- 
tensively studied in the context of consensus or political opinion formation both in homogeneous 
populations [1, 2] and in social networks [3]. Besides the formal mathematical analogy, we intend 
to convey the transdisciplinary viewpoint, to view (a) the protocol handshake between two comput-
er nodes as an interaction between agents within an (artificial) society, and (b) social individuals 
within a population, when exchanging and agreeing on opinions, implicitely perform a formal pro-
tocol that is (observing some transmission uncertainties frameable in an information- theoretical 
treatment) prescribed by a logical set of social rules. 
To arrive at a mathematically or computationally tractable model, it appears necessary to razor 
down the model to the bare necessities of the mechanism. The voter model [4] casts opinion trans-
mission from one agent to annother into only one possible elementary interaction: in each time step, 
one agent is selected at random, and thereafter persuades annother agent, that is randomly chosen 
among the next neighbours. We observe that the interaction topology, defined by a graph adjacency 
matrix, will influence the dynamics of the opinion formation process. 
Although it has been prominetly questioned whether the voter model itself serves as a precise 
model for voters [5] it is acknowledged that statistical scaling features of opinion formation pro-
cesses are covered even from this simplified model. 
1.2. Definition of the Voter Model 
The voter model mathematically is defined as a discrete stochastic process [4]. In its standard 
version, the system is comprised of N nodes forming a connected graph with adjacency matrix (aij), 
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and the system state is defined by the state of all nodes, which can assume the values 0 or 1, respec-
tively. These binary states can reflect opinions, an activated gene, an infection status in a contagion 
system, or the certification status of a node in a computer network. In the case of all nodes being in 
a homogeneous initial condition, i.e., all 0 or all 1, due to the absence of mutations or spontaneous 
opinion changes, no further change takes place, hence these states are absorbing states of the dy-
namics. In each step in discrete time, the following dynamics (algorithm) is executed: 
1) One node is chosen at random. 
2) One of the nodes j is connected to i (i.e., aij = сhosen at random. 
3) Node j assumes the state (opinion) of node i. 
The last step can be interpreted in the way that node i convinces node j. If all nodes reach the 
same state, all 0, or all 1, consensus is reached, and the number of iterations is called time to con-
sensus. It is common to perform Monte-Carlo simulations averaging over a sufficiently large num-
ber of initial conditions, to obtain reliable estimates for the expected average time to consensus. As 
the average time to consensus is largest when the number of 0 states and 1 states in the initial con-
figuration equals N/2 , we have chosen such a symmetric configuration of maximal dissensus as ini-
tial configuration for all our simulations of the voter model. 
1.3. Consensus Formation in the Voter Model in Different Topologies 
To address systematically the average time to consensus, we have performed extensive Monte 
Carlo simulations of the voter models on different network architectures. These include an all-to-all 
coupled network (also known as complete graph in graph theory), a ring network as a one-
dimensional structure with periodic boundary conditions, and specific hierarchical tree structures 
that resemble hierarchical both social and computer architectures. 
Fig. 1 displays the average time to consensus depending on the total number of nodes N , in 
double logarithmic plot, for the different architectures. 
2. Trust formation in computer networks  
The concept of consensus formation takes place not only in the context of social networks, but 
also in the context of computer protocols. For almost 20 years, the society has been introducing 
electronic technologies into its life.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Simulation results for the voter model on different network topologies. Distribution of different opin-
ions on initial stage is 50/50. Probability of acceptance neighbor’s opinion is equal to 0.5.  
(Results are averaged over 100 experiments) 
 
Building trust in the online environment is a key to economic and social development. Lack of 
trust makes stakeholders hesitate to carry out transactions electronically and to adopt new services. 
The critical issue is to ensure trust in an environment of mutual distrust: a network where none of 
the participants trust the other. Let us mention that not only people can act as participants in the 
network, but also artificial intelligence agents. For instance, when building a network using the In-
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ternet of Things. As we can see, successful implementation of modern technologies of electronic 
management, electronic trusted services are not possible without the creation of an appropriate in-
frastructure. The infrastructure for implementing the above mentioned technologies is the public 
key infrastructure (PKI). 
PKI is a set of tools (technical, material, human, etc.), distributed services and components, 
which are collectively used to support crypto tasks based on private and public keys [8]. It does not 
matter whether it is a national PKI to support electronic signature tasks or a private PKI for an indi-
vidual organization to support employee authentication processes, or PKI deployed on a smart home 
base, the principles for ensuring security remain unchanged. 
In fact, PKI are based on several basic principles: 
1. Private Key is known only to its owner.  
2. Certification Authority (CA) creates an electronic document – a public key certificate, thus 
certifying the fact that the private key is known exclusively to the owner of the certificate, the pub-
lic key is freely transferred in the certificate. 
3. Nobody trusts each other, but everyone trusts to CA.  
4. CA confirms or refutes the belonging of the public key to the given person who owns the 
corresponding private key. 
As we can see CA acts the role of security guarantor. Although, the presence of the guarantor 
itself cannot ensure the security of iterations between network users. Additionally, to ensure the 
trust between participants reliable implementation of actual trust model should be done. 




Fig. 2. Strict hierarchy of CA 
 
• strict hierarchy of CA; 
• not a strict hierarchy of CA; 
• policy based hierarchy; 
• distributed trust model; 
• quadrilateral trust model; 
• trust model around the user; 
• web trust model. 
In current paper we will consider two of them (a) Strict hierarchy of CA and (b) Trust model 
around the user, since the first one is the most widespread nowadays and the second is very con-
venient for developing distributed PKI. 
2.1. Hierarchical PKI developing principles 
The hierarchical structure is easy to imagine as a tree with a root at the top and leaves at the 
bottom (as shown in Fig. 2). The end point of trust is the root of the tree. The number of intermedi-
ate levels can be different, including zero. Classically, in a hierarchical architecture, security is en-
sured by the trust of all participants to a third trusted party, certification authorities, based on the 
fact that they are subject to a certification procedure. 
A user requiring knowledge of a public key generally needs to obtain and validate a certificate 
containing the required public key. If the public key user does not already hold an assured copy of 
the public key of the CA that signed the certificate, the CA’s name, and related information (such as 
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the validity period or name constraints), then it might need an additional certificate to obtain that 
public key. Certification paths start with a public key of a CA in a user’s own domain, or with the 
public key of the top of a hierarchy. In both cases, it is impossible to verify the validity of the user’s 
public key certificate without building a complete certificates chain. Such a chain links current user 
and a tree top. This structure allows reliably implement iterations between users, since CA is con-
sidered as trust anchor. On the other hand, that means that in the network there are a number of crit-
ical and potentially vulnerable points. Usually, these points should be subject to regular audit and 
strict control. In order to reduce the risk of data loss, it is necessary to store a large amount of back-
ups, which significantly increases the cost of maintaining the system. 
We can conclude that such structure has a number of other drawbacks [11], [12]: 
• security of the hole system depends on CA root certificate. In case of its compromise, all 
certificates in the system are compromised; 
• users do not actually dispose of their identity. If necessary, make any adjustments user need 
to contact CA; 
• lack of interoperability, since certificates issued by different CA not always could be used in 
one system; 
• there is no one-to-one correspondence between the user and the certificate, by how many 
certificates can be issued for one user. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example of distributed PKI 
 
2.2. Decentralized PKI developing principles 
Another way for developing PKI without building tree structure was proposed by authors in 
paper [11]. The main idea was to exclude the central point of trust and ensure security using 
blockchain technology. 
The blockchain technology [9] was introduced in 2008, its first implementation, i.e. Bitcoin, 
was introduced a year later, in 2009, published in the paper ”Bircoin: a Peer-to-Peer Electronic 
Cash System” under alias Satoshi Nakamoto [10]. Since then, this technology has only gained its 
spread, cryptocurrencies and e-commerce market remain the main areas of application [15 – 17]. 
However, besides its use in electronic commerce, the blockchain technology can be implemented in 
other aspects. In particular, in order to avoid the disadvantages associated with the construction of a 
hierarchical structure. The main idea of using blockchain technology for building a decentralized 
PKI is that we place the register of the public key certificate status into blocks, thus, ensuring its 
safe storage. At the same time, the special structure of the distributed database allows users to relia-
bly verify the certificate of the public key of another user with- out referring to a third trusted party. 
The main difference from the hierarchical structure is that users independently store their key pair, 
so that a user’s public key certificate can be obtained only from himself. Special procedure was in-
troduced only for the new user primary identification process. For this purpose, trusted nodes (ana-
logs of CA) still exist, but their functions are sharply reduced compared with the hierarchical struc-
ture. After a new user goes through the primary identification procedure at a trusted site, he will no 
longer be contacted. 
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Such a structure can be a variation of distributed graphs (in this paper we will consider only a 
fully connected graph) as shown in Fig. 3. 
According to [12] the main advantages of such propose are: 
• considerable reduction in the cost of maintaining a cumbersome hierarchical structure of 
CA; 
• users are able independently control their identification data and is able to immediately re-
port about the need for their correction (compromise); 
• leveling ”man in the middle” threat. The intruder will need to attack the entire system; 
• the directed attack target disappeared. In contrast to hierarchical structure, when the main 
targets for the attackers were CA, in this case there is no clear target for the attack, because 
the information is stored in a distributed manner and in fact the attacker is forced to attack 
the whole network but not a specific node; 
• the proposed system coulb be used not only for the electronic signature service, but also for 
ensuring the electronic identification; 
• collapse of one or more nodes does not result in system shutdown; 
• no need to make and store backups; 
• system interoperability relies on the fact that certificates issued by various CA can easily be 
used in a single system; 
• easy scalability, because adding a new user (a new node) occurs without changing the basic 
principles of the architecture. 
3. The analogy between opinion formation in social network and trust formation in PKI  
By consensus in PKI, we mean the state of the network, in which each node is confident in the 
legitimacy of all other participants. This is possible after the “network authorization” procedure. 
The essence of which is to initiate the interaction of each user with all others according to the laws 
of the certification chain in a hierarchical structure and according to the blockchain laws in a dis-
tributed one. 
In this section, we present the results of simulations that were carried out using the developed 
software. Note that we did not integrate the digital signature algorithms directly. For the comparison 
procedure, it is sufficient for us to state that a uniform digital signature algorithm is applicable in all 
topologies. 
To perform simulations regarding “network authorization” procedure on different topologies, 
the following initial conditions should be specified: 
1. The network is given by a graph (fully connected or hierarchical one). 
2. Nodes store the field ”opinion” (boolean values 1 – user is legitimate, 0 – intruder). 
3. Participants do not know in advance which of the nodes are controlled by intruders. They 
can figure it out only in process of pairwise interaction. That means (a) passing through the 
certification path in the hierarchical architecture or (b) by interacting with each other partic-
ipant in a distributed one. 
4. We assume that at the initial stage, 50 percent of the nodes are controlled by attackers. 
5. If an intruder is detected, he (and the nodes that depend on him in the tree) should be ex-
cluded from the network and consensus formation should be completed without it. In this 
way a network of legitimate participants will be formed and they will be able to interact 
seamlessly and securely. 
6. Nodes that have been excluded from the network have to be regenerated (again with a prob-
ability of 50 percent) and added to the network. 
7. By consensus time, we will mean the time spent on the full authorization of the network (in-
cluding the time for regeneration and re-connection of nodes) 
The following assumptions are necessary to describe the “network authorization” procedure: 
• the considered topologies are in a closed / protected space (thus, we consider a private PKI 
or a private blockchain); 
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• the time of mutual/cross verification (verification of the public key certificate) takes one it-
eration; 
• the node regeneration time takes two iterations (since it is necessary to regenerate the private 
key and create a new public key certificate). 
3.1. Hierarchical network protocol 
For the correct work of the protocol, prerequisite is to follow the requirements that are en-
shrined in X.509 [7]. Current paper considers only the protocol for a strict hierarchical structure, 
which means the need to build a certification path up to the root node when initializing the interac-
tion of any two users. 
”Network authorization” procedure for hierarchical net- work topology should consist of fol-
lowing. 
1. The interaction begins with the leaves of the tree and has a direction to the root. 
2. The route is determined by the rules of the certification path in accordance with X.509 [7]. 
3. When an intruder node is detected, it and all of its child nodes must be excluded and sub-
jected to a regenerating procedure. 
4. The interaction procedure should continue for all legitimate sites. 
5. After all the legitimate nodes have interacted; the procedure for regenerating the offending 
nodes should be be started. 
Moreover, 
• if the node-intruder had no children (acted as an end user), during the procedure of its re-
plenishment there is a probability (we will set it equal to 50 percent) that it will again appear 
to be intruder. 
• if not (acted as a certificate authority), then it should be directly regenerated with the value 
“1-legitimate”, and all its child nodes, with a probability of 50 percent can again become in-
truders. 
Corresponding simulations were performed for two hierarchical topologies types : for (a.1) tree 
where every node has a degree of three (Fig. 4 ) and (a.2) tree with five hubs (Fig. 5). 
The tree with every node degree is three is a classic symmetrical PKI, which is well suited for 
structuring an indepth organizational structure. The limited number of child nodes does not allow 
the system to expand rapidly in the horizontal direction. An example of the use of such a PKI can be 
the union of small but clearly structured units. 
From the opposite side, it is worth noting that tree with five hubs looks typical for a “wide” 
company PKI organization. With this topology, we have several (in this case, five) large subtrees 




Fig. 4. Tree where every node has a degree of three 
 
 
Fig. 5. Five-hubs Tree 
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Fig. 6. Simulation results for different topology types. Distribution of legit users/intruders on initial stage is 
50/50. Probability of regeneration for node is equal to 0.5. Results are averaged over 100 experiments 
3.2. Distributed network protocol 
”Network authorization” procedure for hierarchical net- work topology should consist of fol-
lowing. 
1. Interaction could be started from any node in the network. 
2. It is required to perform pairwise certification (ex- change key certificates) between every 
nodes 
3. When an intruder node is detected, it must be excluded and subjected to a regenerating pro-
cedure. 
4. The interaction procedure should continue for all legitimate sites. 
5. After all the legitimate nodes have interacted, the procedure for regenerating the offending 
nodes must be launched (taking into account the probability of regeneration equal to 50 per-
cent) 
The protocol continues its operation until all nodes are legitimate and do not interrelate with 
each other. 
3.3. Simulation results 
Fig. 6 presents results of simulations. 
We can conclude that for smaller networks distributed networks shows much better time to 




Fig. 7. Simulation results for Tree topologies. Dependence of the number of legitimate nodes that have been 
excluded from the size of the network. Distribution of legit users/intruders on initial stage is 50/50. 
Probability of regeneration for node is equal to 0.5 
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This tendency can be explained by the fact that to establish all links to a node in a distributed 
structure, it is necessary to perform a greater number of “handshakes” (cross-certification proce-
dures) with a larger system size. At the same time for tree structures, this number grows at a slower 
rate. 
However, another parameter should be taken into ac- count too. The number of legit users, 
which were excluded from the network. Obviously, such a situation is possible only in tree struc-
tures (Fig. 7), and for a distributed net- work, this value will be zero for any size of the network. 
Based on the plot it is clear that with the growth of the network, the number of legitimate users 
who have been excluded and regenerated is growing and can reach 50 percent (and in some cases 
100 percent) of the number of all users on the network. This is easy to imagine if the root node of 
the tree system is compromised. This situation causes network redundancy and leads to inefficient 
use of resources. 
Discussion and conclusions 
Nowadays progress in the field of electronic technologies allows providing more efficient elec-
tronic trusted services. Building trust is an important task for the reliable critical infrastructures 
functioning at any level. Moreover, to conduct completely secure interactions, not only the trust 
among the users (human or artificial intelligence) is required, but also confidence in the technology 
itself. Distributed trust models and public key infrastructures will become information technologies 
of increasing importance, especially in the context of information security when quantum compu-
ting technologies become available. Industries, trafic and trade networks as well as the public ser-
vices sector are increasingly relying on secure networks [13], [14], which often operate internation-
ally and on scales of large number of nodes. This imposes challenges on the architecture of the veri-
fication protocols, such that these can be managed with computational and network resources scal-
ing with system size in a feasible way. Besides optimizing the protocols themselves, the network 
topology of each verification concept will have a significant impact on its efficiency. PKI looks like 
a very promising instrument to ensure trust in a mutual distrust network, however, zero-day threats, 
such as the active development of quantum computing, should be taken into account. And if we do 
so, then it should be understood that the security of the whole system cannot rely only on the key 
parameters cryptographic security, but additional measures are also required to ensure the resilience 
of the system. Such measures can be distributed technologies, in particular, those based on the 
blockchain technology. Here, we have investigated distributed PKI in comparison with hierarchical 
CA architecture. The time (in units of protocol verification steps) for verification of all nodes in the 
whole network has, as we argue, an important analogy to the time to consensus formation in a social 
network. Consequently, we investigate this time to consensus on different topologies, both for com-
puter verification protocols, and for consensus formation in social networks as described by the 
well-established voter model. We have performed Monte-Carlo simulations for all-to-all coupled 
networks, or complete graphs, resembling a fully distributed PKI, or a maximally connected social 
network in which information may reach out to any node. This is not unrealistic in some social 
subnetworks, like a school class, or the scientific com- munity where all university lecturers and ac-
tive researchers can be reached electronically through their departmental email documented in the 
web. For representative hierarchical architectures, we have focused on a tree where all top and mid-
dle layer nodes have a node degree of three, and a hub-tree akin of a company with 5 departments 
and flat hierarchy therein. These two trees represent a many- layer structure and a few-layer struc-
ture, respectively. We find that, in the social opinion formation by the voter model, the distributed 
network, by large margin, provides fastest consensus. This result holds over the whole range of in-
vestigated network sizes. While both tree architectures perform similarly on small networks, for 
large networks the 5-hub trees converge slower, even with a different scaling, to consensus. For 
medium-size networks, the results for the verification protocols are similar, although the 5-hub trees 
outperform the many-layer trees for medium and large net- works. Counterintuitively, the largest 
networks investigated (around N = 200) show a decaying performance for the distributed networks. 
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This may be related to our assumption, originally motivated from the opinion formation analogy, of 
50 of 100 nodes being not trusted, which puts the system in a dynamical regime where recovery to a 
fully certified net- work may take long. Further, our investigation confirms our hypothesis that the 
network topology has a significant role in the time to consensus. However, the network architecture 
which is optimal may still depend on the type of protocol (where we made some generic assump-
tions), and on the system size. This aspect, together with addressing resilience to targetet attacks, 
should be subject of further investigation. 
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